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was guilty of contributory negligence in that case for driving a horsedrawn vehicle on the tracks at a trot; in New York, C. & St. L. R. Co. V.
Leopold,"1 the court so held where decedent did not look and listen, or
did not heed what he saw or heard; in Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. V.
2
Baker,1 and Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Pace,13 for failure to stop;
and in

forward.

Chicago & E.

R.

Co. v.

4

Thomas,1 for failure to alight and go

It usually is a question for the jury, however, and it is a question

for the court only when the facts are undisputed and the act done or
omitted "is so absolutely inconsistent with the exercise of ordinary care
that there could be no room for reasonable minds to differ on the question."15 The standard of care which must be used is supposed to be the

same whether the traveler is on foot, on horseback, in a wagon, a carriage,
an automobile, or any other vehicle, according to the statement in one
case.16
There is no doubt, however, that the case of Goodman V. B. & 0. R. Co.
was intended to and did lay down a rigid and uniform standard of conduct
for travelers where they are familiar with the crossing, and where the

view is obstructed; but as stated above, the courts hold that the tracks
are themselves notice of the danger, and so include in the rule those who
7
are not in fact familiar with the crossing.'
However, the Federal courts
and most others hold that when safety appliances are placed at a crossing,
they are an invitation to cross with an implied assurance that no train

is approaching which the driver may to some extent rely upon-at least,
so far as to relieve him from the duty of stopping.

Two Federal cases

do not include watchmen or flagmen at the crossing in this exception.S
Since the Indiana courts do not require stopping as a standard of conduct,
however, and since the evidence in the principal case was not such that
all reasonable men would agree that deceased did not exercise ordinary
care, the court did not deviate from Indiana law in submitting the case
9
to the jury.1
W. T. H.
CORPORATIONS-PoWER TO IssuE AND REDM PREFERRED STOcK.-Hogin,
McKinney and Co., an Indiana corporation, bad issued 600 shares of preferred stock due serially from 1924 to 1930.
Plaintiff held series "F"
one hundred shares par value of $100 per share due July 1, 1929.
On
Nov. 13, 1929 the corporation gave its note to plaintiff for $10,000 to
- 73 Ind. App. 309, 127 N. E. 298 (1920).
- 190 Ind. 633, 128 N. E. 836 (1921).
-5179 Ind. 415, 101 N. E. 479 (1913).
11155 Ind. 634, 58 N. E. 1040 (1900).
1Central Ind. R. Co. v. Wishard, 186 Ind. 262, 114 N. E. 970 (1917); Cleveland,
C., C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Baker, 190 Ind. 633, 128 N. E. 836 (1921) ; Lake Brie & W.
R. Co. v. McFarren,188 Ind. 113, 122 X. E. 330 (1919); Pittsburgh,C., C. & St. L.
Rt. Co. v. Dove, 184 Ind. 447, 111 N. E. 609 (1916).
"dPittsburgh,C., C. & St. L. Rt. Co. v. Dove, 184 Ind. 447, 111 N. E. 609 (1916).
"Teague v. St. Louis, S. W. Rt. Co., 36 Fed. (2nd) 217 (1929)-electric gong;
Canadian Pao. 1?. Co. v. Slayton, 29 Fed. (2nd) 687 (1928)-gates; and see cases
cited in 2 R. C. L. 1206 and 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 702.
"8B. & 0. Railroad Co. v. Shaw (1929), 34 Fed. (2nd) 410; Brommer v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 179 Fed. 577 (1910).
"See 46 1,. R. A. (N. S.) 702; 16 Calif. L. R. 238; 18 Calif. L. R. 203; 8 N.
Carolina L. R. 293; 21 Columbia L. R. 290; 28 Columbia L. R. 250; 37 Yale L. T.
532; 2 R. C. L. 1206; 3 Elliott on Railroads (2nd Ed.) soc. 1166; 51 C.S. 279.

RECENT CASE NOTES
redeem the mature preferred stock and plaintiff retained stock as collateral
security. The corporation was solvent at that time and remained solvent
for some time thereafter. The plaintiff brought this action on the note
against the receiver of the insolvent corporation and obtained judgment.
Receiver appealed. Held, that the retirement of stock was provided for
by statute; and since the corporation was solvent at the time it gave
the note to redeem the stock there was no fraud upon subsequent creditors;
and that the plaintiff was entitled to share in distribution of assets as a
creditor.'
Here there was clearly a valid issuance of the preferred stock since
the statute2 authorized the issuance of preferred stock. Even in the absence
of statute expressly authorizing preferred stock, that power is implied
in the absence of prohibition or restriction, but is subject to the qualification that it must be exercised for a legitimate purpose and that no
contract right of other stockholders is impaired.3 Power exists if authorized
by the articles of incorporation, or by by-laws, adopted by the corporation
prior to the issuance of the common stock, since by such action the rights
of stockholders are not impaired. The power may be obtained after
issuance of common stock if all the stockholders consent. 4 But in Indiana
by statute5 the preferred stock could be issued after an issuance of common
stock over the dissent of a stockholder. However, in some states preferred
stock cannot be issued against the dissent of any holder of common stock,
if his contract with the corporation will thereby be broken or impaired.6
Thus if not expressly authorized by charter, law or articles of incorporation
to issue preferred stock when a corporation issues common stock, it cannot
afterward issue preferred stock without unanimous consent of holders of
common, stock. 7 Sometimes the power to borrow money may be relied
upon as authorizing the issuance of preferred stock, when issued merely
as security for such repayment. 8
When preferred stock is issued, the rights of the preferred stockholder
depend upon the terms of his contract with the corporation9. Since there
seems to be almost unlimited degrees of preference that a preferred stockholder may receive, the problem of the rights of preferred stockholders as
distinguished from the rights of creditors often becomes greatly involved.
It has been said that a person cannot, by virtue of a certificate of preferred
stock be, at least as to the creditors of the corporation, both a stockholder
and a creditor at the same time. This seems to be true in the case of
'Campbell v. Grant Trust & Savings Co., July 27, 1932, Appellate Court of
Indiana, 182 N. E. 267.
2Burns' Ann. St. 1926, Sec. 4994.
2Hogsett v. Aetna Building & Loan Asn. (1908), 78 Kans. 71, 96 Pac. 52;
Kent v. Quicksilver Min. Co. (1879), 78 N. Y. 159; People v. Hugo (1920), 181
App. Dlv. 628, 182 N. Y. Supp. 9.
'Banigan v. Bard (1890), 134 U. S. 291, 33 L. Ed. 932, 10 Sup. Ct. 565; Hazlehurst v. Savannah (1871). 43 Ga. 14; Kent v. Quicksilver (1879), 78 N. Y. 159.
'Burns' Ann. St. 1926, Sec. 4994.
'Kent v. Qutcksilver (1879), 78 N. Y. 159.
7Kent v. Quicksilver (1879), 78 N. Y. 159; Knoxville C. G. & L. By. Co. v.
Enoxvile
(1896), 98 Tenn. 1, 37 S. W. 883.
8
Totten v. Tison (1875), 54 Ga. 140.
$ Wilson v. Laconia Car Co. (1931), 275 Mass. 435, 176 N. E. 182.
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ordinary preferred stock.1O But it does not seem to be true under some
statutory provisions, for the legislature may expressly authorize the issuance of stock which will give the holders the rights of creditors, and a
lien on the property of the corporation which will have a priority over
the claims of subsequent creditors, and at the same time give them all
the rights and subject them to the liabilities of a stockholder. Thus the
holder of the so-called preferred stock that has a lien upon the property
has rights superior to the rights of subsequent creditors.1l The nature
of the transaction is to be determined by the real substance and effect
of the contract rather than by the name given to the obligation or its
form,1 2 and the fact that the shares are denominated preferred stock
either in the certificates or by the legislature is not conclusive.' 3
Preferred stock can be issued upon any condition not prohibited by
statute, or articles of association, or contrary to public policy.14 When
preferred stock is issued a corporation may include a provision for its
redemption,15 but such a right is not to be inferred from ambiguous words
in the certificate.16 Provisions for redemption, when valid, are binding
upon the preferred stockholders,17 and upon creditors whose claims accrue
subsequent to the redemption.' 8 Again, the provision that the stock "shall
be retired" on a certain date has been held to indicate that the holder is
a creditor.1 9 However, even if the provision for retirement upon a certain
date would not make the holder of a certificate a creditor, the retirement
provision is valid20 and binding upon creditors whose claims accrued
after redemption. The action of the corporation in redeeming the preferred
stock after the maturity date by note is valid against subsequent creditors,
since the corporation was solvent when the stock was redeemed. The
redeeming of the stock is a part of the corporate business that devolved
upon the board of directors. 2 '
A more interesting problem arises where the corporation is solvent
at the time that the first stock is redeemed, but the claims of creditors
have arisen before the redemption. This is a much closer case but it
seems that the redemption should be valid if the corporation was solvent
"Booth v. Union Fibre Co. (1919), 142 Minn. 127, 171 N. W. 307; Star Pub.
Co. v. Ball (1922), 192 Ind. 158, 134 N. E. 285.
"Heller v). National Marine Bank (1898), 80 Md. 602, 43 Atl 800, 45 L. R. A.
438, 7 Am. St. Rep. 212; Savannah v. Silverberg (1899), 108 Ga. 281, 33 S. E. 908;
Totten v. Tison (1875), 54 Ga. 139; Burt v. Rattle (1876), 31 Ohio St. 116; Fryer
v. Wiedemann (1912), 148 Ky. 379, 146 S. W. 752, 39 L. 1. A. (N. S.) 1011.
"Burt v. Rattle (1876), 31 Ohio St. 116.
1
3Heller v. National Marine Bank (1898), 80 Md. 602, 43 Ati. 800; Burt
Rattle (1876), 31 Ohio St. 116.
14 Coggeshall v. Georgia Land & Investment Co. (1914), 14 Ga. App. 637,
S. E. 156.
11Coggeshall v. Georgia Land & Investment Co. (1914), 14 Ga. App. 637,
S. E. 156; Hackett v. Northern Pao. B. Co. (1901), 36 Misc. 583, 73 N.

v.
82
82
Y.

Supp. 1087.
1"Star Pub. Co. v. Ball (1922), 192 Ind. 158, 134 N. E. 285.
17TWeidenfeld v. Northern Pac. R. Co. (1904), 129 Fed. 305.

"3Manningtonv. Hocking Valley By. Co. (1910), 183 Fed. 133.
"Savannah v. Silverberg (1899), 108 Ga. 281, 33 S. E. 908; Best v. Oklahoma
Mill. Co. (1927), 124 Okla. 135, 253 Pac. 1005; Allen v. Northwestern Mfg. Co.
(1920), 189 Iowa 731, 179 N. W. 130.
"'Burns' Ann. St. 1926, Sec. 4994.

"aManningtonv. Hocking Valley Ry. Co. (1910),

183 Fed. 133.
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and the rights of the creditors were not prejudiced at the time of the
redemption. In Westerfeld-Bonte Co. v. Burnett22 it was held that where
there was a valid agreement to redeem preferred stock, the provision
for redemption was enforceable so long as it would not affect the collection
of claims by creditors, even tho it would result in winding up and dissolution of the corporation. This case seems entirely sound and would
always permit the redemption of preferred stock, where there was a
redemption provision, if the corporation is solvent. Furthermore, if a
creditor could interfere with the redemption of preferred stock even when
it would not be prejudicial to his interests it would always be an impossibility to redeem preferred stock since practically all corporations have
some creditors at all times.
C. A. R.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS--MARRAGE or INSANE PERsoN Vom--CMMON
LAW MARRIAGE PEsuMED.-Grace Langdon and William Langdon were

married Sept. 15, 1923, and since that time until the death of William
Langdon in 1929, the two lived together as husband and wife. Grace
Langdon upon her husband's death brought suit against the brothers
and sisters of William Langdon to quiet the title to her interest in her
husband's real estate, and for partition. The defendants filed a counterclaim alleging that William Langdon was insane at the time of the marriage to plaintiff, that she had no interest in the property, and asking
that their title be quieted and the marriage of Grace Langdon and William
Langdon be declared void. Held, altho the marriage of a person who is
insane at the time of the ceremony is absolutely void under Burns R. S.
1926, Sec. 9862, still, if the parties to the ceremonial marriage continued
to live and cohabit together as husband and wife, "the law will presume
a good common law marriage, the presumption being in favor of morality
and not immorality, legitimacy and not bastardy."1
It would seem that the court reached a desirable result in upholding
the marriage. "Every intendment of the law is in favor of matrimony.
When a marriage has been shown in evidence, whether regular or irregular,
and whatever the form of proof, the law raises a strong presumption of
its legality; not only casting the burden of proof on the party objecting,
but requiring him throughout, and in every particular, plainly to make
the fact appear, against the constant pressure of this presumption that
it is illegal and void. So that it cannot be tried like ordinary questions
of fact, which are independent of this sort of presumption." 2 In accordance with this theory it has been held that though a person once adjudged
insane by a proper tribunal is presumed to continue to be insane until
the contrary is shown,3 a person adjudged insane three years before a
marriage, was presumed to have regained his sanity at the time of such
12

Westerfield-Bonte Co. v. Burnett (1917), 176 Ky. 188, 195 S. W. 477.

Langdon v. Langdon, Supreme Court of Indiana, Dec. 7, 1932, 183 N. E. 400.
2 Bishop on Marriage and Divorce, Vol. 1, 6th ed., sec. 457; quoted in Boulden
v. McIntire (1889), 119 Ind. 574, 21 N. E. 445; and cited in Weeing v. Temple
(1896), 144 Ind. 189, 41 N. E. 600. See also Castor v.Davis (1889), 120 Ind. 231;
Teter v. Teter (1885), 101 Ind. 129, 51 Am. Rep. 742; Franklin v. Lee (1901), 30
Ind. App. 31, 62 N. E. 78.
sReden v. Baker (1882), 86 Ind. 91.

